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DUAL RATIONALITY OF SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: CREATION OF NEW RIGHTS
IN THE SHADOW OF INCOMPLETE
CONTRACT PARADIGM
SABY GHOSHRAY∗
O Romeo, Romeo,
Wherefore art thou Romeo?
Deny thy father and refuse thy name,
Or if thou wilt not, be but sworn my love,
And I’ll no longer be a Capulet.1
I. INTRODUCTION

T

he story of Romeo and Juliet embodies the tragic theme
of unattainable love, which tugs at the heartstrings of human
emotions. Their unattainable love was due in part to the hate
* Dr. Saby Ghoshray is the author of over seventy scholarly
publications, specializing in Constitutional Law, International Law,
Capital Jurisprudence, Military Tribunals, and Cyberspace Law, among
others. His work has appeared in the Albany Law Review, ILSA Journal
of International and Comparative Law, the European Law Journal ERAForum, the Toledo Law Review, Temple Political & Civil Rights Law
Review, Catholic Law Journal, Miami Law Review, and Georgetown
International Law Review. The author would like to thank Schulke for her
assistance in legal research and typing of the manuscript. The author
would like to thank Jennifer To Shreyoshi and Sayantan, your support is
endless. Dr. Ghoshray can be reached at sabyghoshray@sbcglobal.net.
1
See The Complete Works of William Shakespeare: Romeo and
Juliet, Scene II, Act II at http://www-tech.mit.edu/Shakespeare/romeo
_juliet/romeo_juliet.2.2.html. The Most Excellent and Lamentable
Tragedie of Romeo and Juliet, commonly referred to as Romeo and Juliet,
is famous for a variety of themes, the most popular being love, or more
notably unattainable love. This particular quote is clearly a recognized
phrase from Shakespeare’s play. Here, Juliet questions out loud from the
balcony of her upstairs window, why must the man she love, Romeo have
the last name of her family’s enemy. But, she also proclaims, if he will
not deny his family, his name, then she will deny her family, if only he
will announce his love for her.
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filled feud between Romeo and Juliet’s families. Juliet’s
family, the Capulets, despised Romeo’s family, the
Montagues. Juliet, however, is not concerned with Romeo’s
name, as her love for him is greater than her family’s hatred
for the Montague name, “What’s in a name? That which we
call a rose, by any other name would smell as sweet,” Juliet
echoes. 2
Juliet’s desire to sanctify her love for Romeo symbolizes
the eternal yearning of most couples to sanctify their union
via societal approval in the form of a marriage. Since the
days of yore, taking the husband’s last name has been the
symbolic representation of the couple entering into
matrimony. What happens when society disapproves of one
of the spouses because of their last name? Furthermore, what
happens when society does not approve of the sexual
relationship of the individuals who desire to marry? The
above saga of Romeo and Juliet showcases these exact
questions and typifies the power and influence society has in
either approving or disapproving the behavior of individuals.
The yearning for recognition, which existed in Romeo and
Juliet, is reverberated across the length and breadth of this
country, as same-sex couples3 seek societal approval of their
love in the form of marriage. Same-sex couples have been
staging an uphill battle to gain the right to enter the protective
paradigm of marriage. Many same-sex couples face severe
hardships because they fall outside the umbrella of the full
legal protection mechanism provided by marriage. Countless
same-sex couples enter into loving, lasting relationships like
their opposite-sex counterparts, yet are denied the very
fundamental rights that come with such expression of
exclusive commitment marked by marriage.
Marriage has profound social, cultural and religious
meaning in the United States. Since the decision to get
married is an intensely personal choice, it is impossible to
2

Id.
The terms ‘same-sex couple’ and ‘same-sex marriage’ refer to
individuals that are generally identified as gay, lesbian, or homosexual,
and having romantic love, and sexual desire for members of the same sex
and wish to formalize the bond within a legally recognized marriage.
3
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enumerate all the reasons why couples decide to marry or to
define or quantify the significance of the marital relationship
across all communities and classes of people. In addition to
the social, cultural, and religious meaning of marriage, it is
also an important legal relationship.4
Despite being a private institution, marriage has been
regulated by societal norms, religious perceptions, and legal
doctrines. Although evidence of same-sex relationships
predate centuries, historically marriage has been viewed as a
heterosexual
union,
thereby
precluding
same-sex
5
relationships from the definition of marriage. Only recently,
this complex and often controversial topic has become “part
of a brave new world of family law that is now beyond the

4

Terence Dougherty, Economic Benefits of Marriage under Federal
and Oregon Law, 3 (2004), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/
reports/reports/EconomicBenefitsOR.pdf.
5
See Don Browning and Elizabeth Marquardt, A Marriage Made in
History? N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at A25, available at
http://www.americanvalues.org/html/marriage_history.html (Historically
there have been a variety of reasons for society to promote the institution
of marriage. Often however, the many reasons are overlooked, as
marriage is inevitably linked with only religious connotations. But:
Marriage is frequently characterized as a religious institution
laden with old prejudices. It is true that Judaism and
Christianity have contributed much to the Western
understanding of marriage. But it is also true that they
absorbed parts of the secular marital codes of Greek law,
Aristotelian philosophy, Roman law and German law. Even
in ancient secular systems, legal marriage was seen as a way
to help society regulate and achieve a complex set of desires
and goals: sexual activity, procreation, mutual help and
affection, and parental care and accountability. Integrating
these classic goods into the institution of marriage was a
task for law, religion and other socializing elements of
society. And although the religious language of sacrament
and covenant adds weight to the law of marriage, each of the
goods of marriage can be identified independently of the
religious symbols that give them depth. Id.
See also Maggie Gallagher, What is Marriage For? The Public Purposes
of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773 (2002).
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complete control of either churches or gay rights advocates.”6
As a result, “nearly a million gays and lesbians identified
themselves as members of same-sex couples in the 2000
census.”7 These same couples are being deprived of a bundle
of rights, granted to opposite sex couples, such as inheritance
and health care because of their denial of marriage rights
based on sexual preference or sexual orientation.8
This unequal treatment of same-sex couples has been the
focus of numerous judicial and legislative tugs of war over
the last three decades.9 Proponents both for and against
6

See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Darren R. Spedale, GAY MARRIAGE:
FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE? WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE
EVIDENCE, 9 (2006).
7
See Margie Mason, Census Figures on Same-Sex Couples, Aug. 8,
2001, available at http://speakout.com/activism/apstories/10044-1.html.
For further census statistics in 2004, see generally U.S. Census Bureau,
America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2004 at Table UC1-UC3,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2004.html.
8
For an excellent compilation of the many state and federal laws, as
well as other articles on the issue of same-sex marriage, see Paul AxelLute, Same-Sex Marriage, Rutgers- the State University of New Jersey
School of Law, Newark, Pathfinder Series, available at
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~axellute/ssm.htm.
9
Let us consider this tug of war. In the United States, some states do
provide a variety of benefits to same-sex couples, but have not legalized
same-sex marriages. Delving a little further, there is a complex web of
state laws that add to the fog of confusion on the topic of same-sex
marriage. For example:
On July 6, 2006, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that
the New York state government is not required to allow
same-sex marriage, affirming the constitutionality of a state
law limiting marriage to a man and a woman. On the same
day, July 6, 2006, the Supreme Court of Georgia reinstated
constitutional ban on gay marriage. On July 26, 2006, the
Washington Supreme Court ruled that the state's DOMA
was not unconstitutional and therefore same-sex marriage is
an issue appropriate for the legislature and not the judiciary
system. Only Massachusetts recognizes same-sex marriage
Vermont and Connecticut offer civil unions, California,
New Jersey, Maine and the District of Columbia grant
benefits through domestic partnerships, and Hawaii has
reciprocal beneficiary laws. In 1999, the Vermont Supreme
Court decided Baker v. Vermont , 170 Vt. 194 (1999) that
their state legislature must establish identical rights for
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same-sex marriage harbor very strong views. As a result, the
last few years have seen the development of a steady stream
of legal scholarship, either supporting or denigrating the right
to marry for same-sex couples.10 In various states, the courts
have been called upon to determine the validity of same-sex
marriages in their respective states. Although the states of
Hawaii11 and Vermont12 came tantalizingly close to bringing
equality in marriage rights, the state of Massachusetts13 was
the first state to have finally achieved equality in same-sex
marriage. Given the prevailing pulse of society, the stage
was set for achieving the long-awaited marriage equality.
The widely anticipated New Jersey Supreme Court ruling of
Lewis v. Harris14 again came short of granting equality in
same-sex couples similar to those of married opposite-sex
couples. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on
November 18, 2003, ruled in the case of Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003), that
denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violates the
state's Equal Protection Clause.
See Wikipedia, Status of Same-Sex Marriage, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Status_of_same-sex_marriage.
10
See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Darren R. Spedale & Hans
Ytterberg, Nordic Bliss? Scandinavian Registered Partnerships and the
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, Issues in Legal Scholarship, Single-Sex
Marriage, 4 (2004)(abstract available at http://www.bepress.
com/ils/iss5/art4).
11
See Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 645 (1993) (Hawaii is
recognized as the first state to allow civil marriages to same-sex couples.
IN 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that limiting marriage only to
opposite-sex couples was unconstitutional. Ultimately though, the state
Constitution was amended to retain the restriction to marry only for
opposite-sex couples).
12
See Baker, 170 Vt. at 194 (The Vermont Supreme Court held that
same-sex couples must have the same benefits that opposite-couples have.
The Legislature created the civil union laws to comply with the mandate,)
13
See Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 309 (The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in 2003 held that restricting same-sex couples from
privileges of marriage was unconstitutional, and the Court in 2004 also
held that civil unions were not sufficient in meeting the mandate.
Therefore, on May 17, 2004 the state of Massachusetts was the first state
in the United States to approve same-sex marriages).
14
See Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415 (2006) (The New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed on October 2006, that same-sex couples must receive the
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marriage rights for same-sex couples. Despite the strong
undercurrent of support percolating across the states, this
denial in Lewis15 reveals a profound Constitutional issue
revolving around fundamental rights.16 The ruling did,
however, send a strong message. The State of New Jersey
must provide opportunities for same-sex couples to enter into
legally recognized unions. Furthermore, the Court requires
the lawmakers to either (i) amend the current marriage
statutes to allow same-sex couples to obtain equal rights and
benefits similar to those of opposite-sex couples, or (ii) create
new statutes with equal rights and privileges for same-sex
couples within 180 days of the ruling.17 Even with this strong
message, it is important to analyze why the Supreme Court of
New Jersey did not invalidate the settled law’s provision
against same-sex marriage after such extraordinary public
interest and expectation.
The ruling recognized civil unions between same-sex
couples by extending them rights and benefits similar to, but
not equal to, marriage. New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine
signed the ‘Civil Union Bill’ on December 21, 2006,18 while
expressing his sincere support for same-sex marriage rights.
Governor Corzine lamented the fact that “society isn’t ready
for that, although he would sign a bill allowing same-sex

same rights and benefits those opposite-sex couples were guaranteed. In
December 2006, the Legislature then enacted a civil union statute to
comply with the ruling of the New Jersey Supreme Court).
15
Id.
16
A journey through the historical archives of constitutional
development in America will reveal that fundamental rights were created
by various means. It came out of the Due Process Clause in Roe v. Wade
which emerged from the Equal Protection Clause in Skinner v. Oklahoma
as the Court said “fundamental right” “emanates” from the Bill of Rights,
as shown in Griswold v. Connecticut. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (discussion of the Due Process Clause); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 391
U.S. 535 (1942) (discussion of the Equal Protection Clause); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (discussion of the Bill of Rights).
17
Lewis, 188 N.J. 415; see also accompanying text, supra note 14.
18
See ABC7 Eyewitness News, Garden State Equality's 'Practical
Guide to Civil Unions', (Dec. 21, 2006), available at http://abclocal.
go.com /wabc/story?section=local&id=4872275.
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couples to marry.”19 The New Jersey Civil Union Bill is not
as expansive as many had hoped.20 The right to marry still
remains unattainable to same-sex couples, as noted in the
legislation:
The Legislature, however, discerns a clear and
rational basis for making certain health and
pension benefits available to dependent
domestic partners only in the case of domestic
partnerships in which both persons are of the
same sex and are therefore unable to enter into
a marriage with each other that is recognized
by New Jersey law, unlike persons of the
opposite sex who are in a domestic partnership
but have the right to enter into a marriage that
is recognized by State law and thereby have
access to these health and pension benefits.21
19

See Geoff Mulvihill, N.J. Civil Unions Hung Up on 'Marriage',
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Dec. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.marriageequalityny.org/2006/12/nj-civil-unions-legislatorsup-on.html. (The Domestic Partnership Act, establishes a domestic
partner status, and additional rights to same-sex couples that reside
together, have proven mutual support, concern, and commitment for each
other). See M. V. Lee Badgett, R. Bradley Sears, and Suzanne Goldberg,
Supporting Families, Saving Funds: A Fiscal Analysis of New Jersey's
Domestic Partnership Act, http://www.lsnjlaw.org/english /family/
domesticpartnership/njdpa/. Institute of Gay and Lesbian Strategic Studies
(IGLSS) and UCLA's Williams Project on Sexual Orientation Law and
Public Policy, December 2003.
20
See e.g., Lewis, 188 N.J. at 448 – 51 (The Domestic Partnership
Act does not provide for marital property rights or automatic parental
rights when a child is born to the couple. Also, “[T]he [Domestic
Partnership] Act has failed to bridge the inequality gap between
committed same-sex couples and married opposite-sex couples.” Id. at
448. “Significantly, the economic and financial inequities that are borne
by same-sex domestic partners are also borne by their children too.” Id. at
450. “Even though they are provided fewer benefits and rights [by the
Act], same-sex couples are subject to more stringent requirements to enter
into a domestic partnership than opposite-sex couples entering into a
marriage.” Id. at 451.).
21
S. 2820, 210th Leg. §e (N.J. 2003), available at http://www.njleg.
state.nj.us/2002/Bills/S3000/2820_U1.HTM [hereinafter “NJ Domestic
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Economists and fiscal planners have been analyzing and
dissecting the economic impact of legalizing same-sex
marriage since the 2004 enactment of the New Jersey
Domestic Partnership Act.22 Against the backdrop of societal
awareness of same-sex marriage, coupled with jurisprudential
precedent set in the state of Massachusetts, the Supreme
Court in New Jersey could very well have granted the right to
marry for same-sex couples.23 Since the New Jersey Court
Partnership Act”]. See generally STEPHEN J. HYLAND, NEW JERSEY
DOMESTIC PARTNERS: A LEGAL GUIDE, (2005).
22
See LSNJ Law, New Jersey’s Domestic Partnership Act,
http://www.lsnjlaw.org/english/family/domesticpartnership/njdpa/. (The
New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act includes the following rights and
responsibilities for those registering under the Act: 1) “The right to decide
about medical treatment and to visit in the hospital;” 2) “New Jersey state
tax benefits;” and 3) “Public employee benefits” Id.
23
See Dr. Nathanial Persily, Expert Comment on Same-Sex Marriage
in
New
Jersey,
Dec.
21,
2006,
http://www.upenn.edu
/pennnews/article.php?id=1065. New Jersey residents were positively
anticipating the New Jersey Supreme Court decision as both national and
the state opinions in New Jersey clearly indicate a trend of growing
acceptance of same-sex marriage. In a recently conducted University of
Pennsylvania study, it was shown that when it comes to the issue of samesex marriage, many more people support civil unions, granting unmarried
couples many of the legal rights of marriage. The study showed:
Our research has found that the backlash that followed the
Massachusetts court's decision to allow gay marriage has
completely subsided. The share of the American public
supportive of same-sex marriage has returned to the place it
was before the courts got involved and appears to be on an
upward trajectory. During that same period, an increasing
share of the American public became in favor of same-sex
civil unions that fall short of marriage. The same-sex
marriage debate in the courts has moved the national debate
and public opinion to the left on this issue, even if no other
state has followed Massachusetts' lead. … Our conclusion is
that because of the court decisions in 2003 and 2004, the
debate over same-sex relationships moved to the left, and
civil unions became the middle position. Id.
See also, American Civil Liberties Union, State Public Opinion from
States on Civil Marriage and Other Recognition of Same-Sex
Relationships, http://www.aclu.org/getequal/ffm/section78/ 8b4 summary
.pdf (a Star Ledger/Eagleton-Rutgers - September 2003 Poll reveals the
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fell short of equalizing marriage rights, the legislature came
up with the idea of a civil union instead of a marriage right.
However, it is not the equality long envisioned by the
proponents of same-sex marriage.24 Why are recognition and
following favorable statistics for same-sex marriage: 43% would allow
same-sex couples to marry, 52% would allow civil unions, 53% would
allow legally married same-sex couples from other states who move to NJ
to be recognized as married in NJ, 60% thought same-sex couples should
be entitled to health insurance and social security benefits through their
partners).
24
Although, marriages between same-sex couples have not been
recognized officially, there are states that offer something similar, besides
New Jersey. See e.g., Baker v. Vermont, 170 Vt. 194 (1999) (Vermont
gives essentially equal treatment to marriage and same-sex civil unions by
the enactment of a law in response to a state court decision mandating
civil unions). See also S.B. 379, 2005 Leg., Gen. Assemb., (Ct. 2005),
http://hartford.about.com/od/connecticutlaws/Connecticut_Laws.htm
[follow “Civil Union Law Passes in Connecticut” hyperlink; Scroll to end
of text, then follow the “view the ‘complete text’” hyperlink] (In 2005,
Connecticut enacted a law giving essentially equal treatment to marriage
and same-sex civil unions, thus making it the first state legislature to enact
civil union law without a court order. In this context, Connecticut State
Insurance Department says that fully insured health plans are required to
treat partners in a civil union the same as spouses are treated for purposes
of health care benefits. However, the full impact on employers that
sponsor fully insured health care plans is yet to be clarified, as it is not
clear if they would have to pay for partners in civil unions, raising thereby
the confusing conundrums the issues of marriage and civil union are
bringing). See also Bob Egelko, San Francisco State's Domestic Partner
Law Survives a Legal Challenge, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON, June 30, 2005,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/06/30/BAG22DG
UC31.DTL (California enacted the State Defense of Marriage Act
(hereafter DOMA), via ballot initiative in 2000, even though it has
domestic partner laws. From a healthcare point of view, California
requires all group health care service plans to provide domestic partners
with health coverage that is equal to what spouses receive. In addition, it
applies to health care coverage offered by employers, not to self-insured
health care coverage. What is not clear, however, whether California can
require an employer that does not offer domestic partner coverage to offer
or subsidize such coverage when providing an insured plan. In this
context, it is worth noting that, California’s domestic partner law survived
a legal challenge, Knight vs. Superior Court, S133961. The State Supreme
Court rejected arguments that domestic partner law was the equivalent of
marriage, in a case where the plaintiffs said it violated California’s
DOMA. State Supreme Court ruled that domestic partnership was not
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rights of equality so hard to come by?25 While these are
some of the poignant questions that confront us today, a
broader economic analysis of the cost-benefit of same-sex
marriage within New Jersey reveals that the economic impact
of same-sex marriage is conducive to granting marriage rights
to same-sex couples.26 The New Jersey legislature’s decision
equal to marriage. As a result, in California, domestic partners are not
eligible for some state marital benefits and a wide range of federal
benefits. As the Court held, “…the domestic- partner law was not equal
to marriage. The courts noted that partners are ineligible for some state
marital benefits and a wide range of federal benefits and may be unable to
get other states to recognize their relationships.”)
25
Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993).
26
See M.V. Lee Badgett & r. Bradley Sears, Equal Rights, Fiscal
Responsibilities: The Fiscal Impact on AB205 California Budget, 2003,
http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/AB205/AB205Study1.pdf (By
using data from New Jersey residents in Census 2000 and using
experiences from other states, Badget and Sears were able to quantify the
likely fiscal effects of the Domestic Partnership Act (hereafter DPA)). See
also M.V. Lee Badget, and R. Bradley Sears, Supporting Families,
Savings Funds: A Fiscal Analysis of New Jersey's Domestic Partnership
Act,
November
2003,
http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/
publications/NJ-DPAStudy.pdf [hereinafter Supporting Families, Saving
Funds] (According to them, out of the rights and benefits provided to
domestic partners in the DPA, only three seem to have any fiscal
significance : (i) “the State will likely save from $46 to $92 million in
avoided public assistance expenditures;” Id. at 22. (ii) “covering the
health insurance of [same-sex] domestic partners of state employees and
retirees will add approximately $7 million in state expenditures, [not
withstanding the fact that] [m]aking same-sex domestic partners eligible
for spousal survivor benefits will probably not result in any increase in
state expenditures;” Id. (iii) “[t]he State will also experience a loss in
transfer inheritance tax revenues in the range of $4.3 to $7.8 million.” Id.
Badget and Sears concluded that the DPA will have a positive impact on
the state budget. They further noted that, even if their predictions about
the State's savings from public benefits is too high, their smallest estimate
for those savings could be reduced by two-thirds, and there would still be
enough savings to off-set the highest projections for the additional costs
of providing state employees with same-sex registered domestic partner
health benefits and the potential loss in inheritance tax revenues. Id.
Badget and Sears concluded that the net impact of the DPA is over $61
million in fiscal savings each year and thus, the Domestic Partnership Act
will provide material support to many New Jersey families without
placing a strain on the state budget. Id.).
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to deny marriage equality, therefore, does not reside in the
budgetary concerns of adverse economics27 nor is it based on
the practicality of economics,28 but perhaps embedded in the
deeper sanctum of the Constitution’s fundamental rights
doctrines. Within these doctrines lies the explanation for
marriage inequality, particularly within the democratic ideals
and long standing constitutional jurisprudence of America.
The liberal movement of granting equal rights of marriage
to same-sex couples has withstood the agonizing years of
abhorrence and apathy and dragged through decades of tacit
approval and silent endorsement. The issue of marriage
equality, after having been decided on and permitted in
Hawaii, Vermont, Massachusetts, and California, has now
touched the hallowed halls of the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Despite evidence of the positive impacts far outweighing the
negative impacts, the Lewis Court’s implicit recognition of
marriage equality remains unattainable.
In an effort to reconcile the inconsistency between liberal
ideals and inequitable adjudication of marriage rights
amongst our citizens, this article will seek answers to these
issues. By straddling the contractual confines of marriage via
law and economic analysis, Part II of the article explores the
contractual paradigm of marriage to examine whether the
framework is independent of sexual orientation and if the
deliberately incomplete nature of marriage can provide
consistencies for all types of marriages. Part III examines
whether the private aspiration of marriage should necessarily
27

See Supporting Families, Saving Funds, supra note 26 (Economic
analysis shows that granting marriage rights to same-sex couples could
bring in substantial budgetary savings to the state. In their study, Badget
and Sears have shown that depending on the proportion of couples who
register, the State could save $50 to $100 million in welfare disbursement
expenditures. They contended, however, “[t]he savings could be
somewhat less if the State only assesses eligibility based on domestic
partners' resources for WFNJ/TANF and Medicaid.” Id. at 4. “As a lower
bound, [however, the study showed] adding the estimates of current
spending on WFNJ/TANF and Medicaid suggests that the State will save
from $46.2 to $92.4 million if the FEA [DPA] is enacted.” Id. For their
calculations, see Id. at 4, Table 2.).
28
Id at 11.
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be linked with public consequences by evaluating the impact
of marriage’s social cost borne by the participants in a
marriage incongruent with broader societal norms. Finally
Part IV engages in an analysis to determine whether equality
of marriage rights come from creating new constitutional
rights or it can be achieved by searching the outliers of
unenumerated rights. Perhaps, implicit within these threads,
somewhere buried deep beneath the constitutional labyrinth
lies the answer to how long it must take to truly incorporate
the Lewis Court’s insightful view that, “equality of treatment
is a dominant theme of our laws and a central guarantee of
our state constitution.”29
II.

DECONSTRUCTING TRADITION: MARRIAGE AS
INCOMPLETE CONTRACT PARADIGM

By taking an expansive view of marriage as a social
contract, it is imperative to understand whether the idea of
same-sex marriage is inconsistent within the broader
construct of marriage as an institution. Although the concept
of marriage originated from the historical judicial
interpretation of the union between a man and woman, its
construct has evolved due to its attendant legal consequences
and the contractual mechanisms that shape its contours. As
newer intimate adult relationships evolve, the nature of
societal relationships unravel to such an extent that the
contractual obligations and legal protection surrounding
marriage take on a more expansive meaning. Implicit in this
expanded construct of marriage resides the issue of social
welfare30 and the impact to third parties or children,31 which
29

Lewis v. Harris, 188 N. J. 415, 456 (2006).
See John Fitzgerald, Marriage Prospects and Welfare Use, in
MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 177, 177-97 (Shoshana A. GrossbardShechtman ed., 2003).
31
Perhaps no other entity is impacted so significantly than the
children. Commentators have noted that, “Children are the most important
marital-specific asset and one of the main advantages of the family.” See
Christina Muller, An Economic Analysis of Same-Sex Marriage, in 2002
GERMAN WORKING PAPERS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS art. 14, 6, available at
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=gwp
30
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further shapes the contours of marriage’s contractual
mechanisms. Therefore, this article will analyze whether the
institutional structure of marriage requires the conservative
fundamentals of religious doctrines and gender-centric
viewpoints for continuation.
Marriage can be seen as a social contract that brings
specific legal consequences32 and inherits socio-economic
impacts that come from its welfare protection mechanism and
third-party implications. Among the different types of
contracts that marriage can encapsulate, several categories are
more prominent than others: (i) no-fault contract,33 where the
parties can walk away from the marriage obligation without
showing any cause for the breakup, (ii) mutual-consent
contract,34 where both parties are required to come to an
agreement for dissolution of the contract, (iii) default

(The author of the study presented a utilitarian viewpoint of children as
public goods for their parents, emphasizing the need for a stable married
relationship for the development of quality in their offspring. This
therefore, established how marriage is a vital ingredient for the betterment
of the next generation of citizens.) See also RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 156 (5th ed., 1998) (1977) (Posner
describes a set of advantages arising out of marriage). See also Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children’s Rights:
Incorporating Emerging Human Rights Into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3 (1999).
32
See generally Steven E. Landsburg, The Marriage Contract:
Divorce Is Just a Breakdown in Negotiations, EVERYDAY ECONOMICS,
Sept. 12, 1997, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2042.
33
See generally id. (In several states, a no-fault divorce is granted
when it is not required for either spouse to show fault, or a reason for the
breakup of the marriage. No-fault, also allows for either spouse to obtain
a divorce, even if the other spouse does not agree to the divorce. A nofault divorce is also granted if the couple has been living separated for
three years.).
34
See id. A mutual-consent contract is exactly as it sounds. Both
spouses agree to end the marriage in a divorce. Mutual-consent divorce
circumvents the difficult issues that arise in the one-sidedness of no-fault
divorce, as it does not permit one spouse to divorce without obtaining the
consent of the other spouse. In mutual-consent divorce process, the
spouses, instead of the government/judges, make the decisions such as
custody and how the assets/finances are distributed.
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contract,35 in which the states will impose laws, without the
explicit provisions of a premarital contract, and (iv) covenant
marriage,36 a type of contract that makes it more difficult on
both parties to dissolve the marriage due to the binding nature
of the contract.
The concept of marriage has evolved from the medieval
marriages of trade-off and arrangements by elders37 to
marriages that are mergers marked by ideals of individual
liberty and spousal equality.38 The scope and limitations of
the marriage contractual construct have expanded. However,
within the congruent limits of liberating ideals of spousal
rights and responsibilities, the understanding of the
contractual dimension of marriage is still evolving. While a
nexus of contract binds the two entities involved in a
35

In various states, a default divorce is granted due to nonperformance by a spouse. Literally, the non-performing spouse defaults
and therefore, the spouse that originated the filing of the divorce
documents is generally awarded what was requested in the complaint for
divorce. See id.
36
In general, covenant marriage laws require a couple to follow the
state law; in addition, the couple must complete marriage counseling prior
to the marriage and also complete counseling before a divorce is granted.
See generally Lyle Jones, An Analysis of Covenant Marriage in Arizona:
as Fault Divorce and Contract, Associated Content (2006),
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/19864/an_analysis_of_covenant
_marriage_in.html.
37
See STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS:
A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE (1989) (Mintz and
Kellogg describe the marriage behaviors of the new Pilgrim immigrants.
The Pilgrim marriages were controlled and arranged by the parents
controlling their children as a source of family income. Through dowries
and inheritance, marriages helped increase family bonds and the ties
through intermarriage of first cousins, as well as brothers and sisters were
valuable to facilitate the family wealth, status and political ambitions.).
38
See Lorna Jorgenson Wendt, Creating a Prenuptial Agreement,
Equality in Marriage Institute, http://www.equalityinmarriage.org/
bmprenup.html (No longer are prenuptial agreements for a select few
individuals. Regularly, couples preparing for marriage enter into legal
prenuptial agreements prior to marriage. The prenuptials are designed to
protect the merger of the two individuals into marriage arrangement.
Prenuptial agreements are designed to protect the married partnership.
Creating a postnuptial agreement also “reflects equality in financial
matters.” Id.).
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marriage, that nexus is shaped by the relative preferences,39
economic incentives,40 and game-theoretic decisionmakings41 of the individuals involved. Although the implicit
promise of a performance of the contract remains intact, both
the content and cost of that contract is continuously changing
within a marriage. Three fundamental factors distinguish a
marriage contract from other contractual arrangements. First,
there is not just one contract that defines marriage, but a
multitude of contracts, sometimes inter-connected, often
concurrent and even embedded within one another, all
shaping the construct of marriage. Therefore, a marriage can
be seen as a nexus of contracts, more like the mechanisms of
a corporation. Second, success or failure of the marriage
contract depends on the relative preferences between the two
39

This is the phenomenon in which agents or entities can affect the
outcome of an event by tailoring their responses based on relative
preference between agents in a two-party game, or amongst agents in a
multi-party game. The assumption in this standard economic model is that
individuals are rational and they are driven to maximize their expected
utility. Recent evidence suggests that some agents' utility depends on both
their own payoff and the payoffs of others. Therefore, an individual's
satisfaction may depend on how much she receives relative to those in a
reference group. For an excellent discussion of relative preference, see
generally Michelle Alexopoulos & Stephen Sapp, Exploring the Behavior
of Economic Agents: The Role of Relative Preferences, in 12 ECONOMICS
BULLETIN 1, 1−7 (2006), available at http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.
edu/2006/volume12/EB-06L20001A.pdf.
40
Fitzgerald, supra note 30.
41
See David K. Levine, What is Game Theory, Department of
Economics,
UCLA,
available
at
http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/general/whatis.htm
(Focusing
on
the
interaction of couples in relationships, in particular marriage is important.
Particularly, exploring interaction between individuals within the
marriage, to meet their individual goals, while also working for the
ultimate good of the marriage relationship. To better understand gametheoretic decision making, consider that:
Although game theory is relevant to parlor games such as
poker or bridge, most research in game theory focuses on
how groups of people interact. There are two main branches
of game theory: cooperative and noncooperative game
theory. Noncooperative game theory deals largely with how
intelligent individuals interact with one another in an effort
to achieve their own goals. Id.
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entities, the asymmetry of economic incentives between the
two entities, and the game-theoretic decision making between
the two entities. These factors change over time resulting in a
continuous evolution of contracts in both its implicit promise
and cost of execution, and which makes the marriage contract
a dynamic self-reinventing nature. Thirdly, if we agree to the
premise that marriage is a complex web of multiple contracts,
as evident by constant change, the idea of marriage is best
encapsulated within an incomplete contract paradigm.42
A.

Nexus of Contract View of Marriage

In a marriage, the involved entities are continuously
entering and exiting various forms of contracts. More often,
the performance of a long-term contract is dependent on
entering into an existing contract from numerous smaller
intermediate contracts. This continuous and evolving process
ends only in the dissolution of marriage. Furthermore, when
the dynamic nature of contract formation and contract
restructuring becomes static, it signals either the marriage is
approaching termination or was never formalized in the first
place.
Some implicit and explicit contractual terms are
contained within the expansive confines of marriage’s
contractual obligations. In addition, marriage involves a
combination of complete and incomplete sets of contracts.
Most contractual arrangements of a marriage include a set of
inter-locking and dynamically interacting sets of complete
and incomplete contracts, with the majority being incomplete.
Marriage creates a freestanding entity to pursue a set of
objectives whose limits are bound by a set of contractual
agreements.
This entity creates legal rights, social
responsibilities, and various third party consequences,
through its formation. The entity also inherits performance
expectation and legal consequences as a prerequisite to its
existence within the society, much like a corporation would.
42

See Saby Ghoshray, Cyberspace Contracting: Embracing
Incomplete Contract Paradigm in the Wake of UCITA Experience, 11
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 609 (2005).
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Therefore, the marriage nexus of a contract is treated as an
entity similar to a corporation. It could be seen as a quasicorporate structure. When a corporation dissolves, the
constituent elements remain responsible for legally mandated
performances. Similarly, in a marriage, the constituent
components become responsible for the legally mandated
performance as stipulated either by the pre-marital
contractual arrangements, or by the default provisions of the
contract implicit within marriage.
The discussion above begs the questions: Do corporations
have a specific gender? Is sexual orientation a mandatory
requirement for the performance of the corporation? Could
the existence of a corporation be denied because of the
assigned sex to the corporation? We know that the answer to
all these questions is negative. Therefore, if a corporation is
not dependent on sexual orientation, why then, does sexual
orientation matter for a marriage to be recognized, nurtured,
and for it to prosper? Implicit acceptance of the corporation
like structure of marriage is consistent with the ideals of
supporting and legalizing marriage between same-sex
couples.
B.

Preference, Incentive and Game-Theoretic
Decision Making: Dynamics of Marriage

The incomplete contract paradigm43 implicit in a marriage
differs structurally from that of a corporation in its ability to
dynamically alter the terms and conditions of the marriage.
In this regard, contractual elements within a corporation are
more fixed than those contained in a marriage. This is so,
because in most marriages, the contractual terms and
conditions go through a continuous evolution; contractual
flexibility arrangement that a corporation does not have. In
this context, this article identifies three main drivers that
shape the contractual arrangement in practice within
marriages. These are (i) individual preferences of the entities
involved in a marriage, (ii) their personal incentives, and (iii)
43

Id at 625.
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game-theoretic decision-making at play for both entities. For
explicit purpose of this discussion, this article will consider
only the relationship of a couple and forgo any discussion on
polygamous44 and polyandrous marriages.45
In a marriage, short-term contracts are created such that
they are neither definite nor complete contracts due to the
asymmetry in preferences between the couple.
This
asymmetry creates unequal and diverging incentives to
complete the contractual obligations. As a result, individual
parties to the contract are driven differently to either
complete or alter the terms of the contract. Here, the two
parties may be sharing the same resources, but each has
different preferences surrounding the scope and enjoyment of
those resources. This in turn drives a bargain mechanism,
whereby each is influenced differently to complete the
contract.
For example, two spouses enter into a contract regarding
who will wash the dinner dishes. In this arrangement, the end
terms are deliberately incomplete, not explicitly specifying
the consequences for non-performance.
Suppose the
assignment of performance, doing the dinner dishes, is based
on the person whose preference will be watching television in
the evening. Now, suppose one spouse enjoys football on a
Sunday evening, the other clearly is interested in reality
television shows and they are sharing one television set.
44

Polygamy is defined as having more than one spouse at a time, for
the vast majority this has been reflected in society with the male spouse
having multiple wives. See generally Danel Bachman & Ronald K.
Esplin, History of Plural Marriage/Polygamy, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MORMONISM, (1992), available at http://www.lightplanet.com/mormons/
daily/history/plural_marriage/History_EOM.htm.
See also Online
Muslim Matrimonial, Why Polygamy Is Allowed in Islam,
http://www.ezsoftech.com/omm/polygamy.asp.
45
See Kelly Stewart, Honey We’re Home, THE DAVIS ENTERPRISE,
(1997) available at http://www.anthro.ucdavis.edu/faculty/stewart.htm
(Polyandry is defined as having more than one husband at a time.
However, the Tibetan culture approves of this style of marriage and
because of this has become a focus of study for researchers. “Typically in
a polyandrous system, a woman marries a man plus his brothers, who
"share" her. Never knowing for certain whether they are fathers or uncles,
the men treat the children born into the family as their own.” Id.).
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Here, the preference asymmetry between football and reality
shows determines the performance of doing the dishes. Who
will do the dishes is being kept open because the incentive to
do the dishes is dependent on the preference over television
viewing. Clearly, by giving up the preference of one’s
chosen television program, the spouse in question could opt
out of performing the dishes. The spouse in question could
re-enter into a second contract of not getting involved into an
act by altering the conditions of the previous contract, by
choosing to do the dishes and to also give up watching her
favorite television show. The game-theoretic decisionmaking enters the dynamics in such that, one spouse knowing
the preference profile of the other, gets into a contract with
incentive such that the counterparty will more likely than not
be unable to perform the contractual obligation. When
competing interests of the contract are shaped by relative
incentives among the participants, each party to the contract
will try to gain economic advantages by entering into
contracts based on their expectation of how the other party
will perform.
Often times, two spouses enter into a contract via
bargaining.46 Evidence of contract via bargaining can be seen
in the framework of prenuptial agreements executed prior to
marriages. During the bargaining process, the two parties
enter into contractual obligations with specified terms and
conditions of non-performance. When a particular spouse
influences the structuring of a particular performance clause,
like that of the non-performance by the other spouse, it will
result in a higher economic gain for the counterparty. If the
spouse knows the preference of the other and negotiates in
such a way that the probability of non-performance by such
counterparty is higher than that of performance, she stands a
better chance of coming out ahead.
The foregoing discussion illustrates why keeping the
contract deliberately incomplete has an economic value
46

See Robert B. Standler, Prenuptial and Postnuptial Law in the
USA, April 24, 2004, http://www.rbs2.com/dcontract.pdf. See also
Hedieh Nasheri, Prenuptial Agreements in the United States: A Need for
Closer Control? 12 INT'L J.L. POL. & FAM. 307 (1998).
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higher than that of making it a complete contract. We have
shown how asymmetry is a preference and how divergence in
economic interests creates contractual surplus in contracts
that contain provisions for changing the definition of
performance and including a penalty for non-performance. In
addition, because of emotional factors involved in marriage,
the preference profile and incentive structure could change
for both parties, making it advantageous to deliberately keep
most contracts incomplete.47
My analysis above explores the complex web of contracts
contained within a combination of complete and incomplete
and implicit and explicit sets of contracts. In cases where
complete contracts are available, it is likely that the
component of completeness is embedded with a larger
incomplete contract. Similarly, most implicit contracts
contain a multitude of smaller explicit contracts. Implicit
contracts, by definition, are incomplete. Therefore, marriage
in general embodies the incomplete contract paradigm, fully
laden with interactive manifestation of asymmetric
preferences and diverging incentives of the parties.
To conclude this section, it is clear that the performance
of a marriage is governed by a series of contractual
arrangements. The contracts themselves are too numerous,
widely diverse, and structurally incomplete in nature.
However, the structure and the performance of these
contracts are no way dependent on the sexual proclivity of the
individual parties for the overall function of the marriage
mechanisms. Similarly, the mechanism is not influenced for
its existence or efficient functioning on the sexual orientation
of the parties involved. Thus, the corporate-like functional
identification of marriage is not consistent with the view that
sexual orientation or sexual preferences of the partners
determine the characteristics of making a successful
marriage.

47

For a discussion on incomplete contract paradigm, see Saby
Ghoshray, Cyberspace Contracting, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 609,
625-26 (2005).
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PRIVATE ASPIRATIONS, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES:
REGULATING INTIMACY BY IMPOSING SOCIAL COST

Marriage is the culmination of private decisions borne out
of romantic involvement of two individuals.
Legal
consequences of marriage allow for immediate amalgamation
of married couples into the social welfare system. Marriage
also brings spontaneous immersion of the individuals within a
protection paradigm. With this, an intimate private matter
now becomes subject to public scrutiny and thus could
become the focus of public sentiment. It can be argued, that
as long as a marriage does not interfere with another
individual’s rights, there is absolutely no case for denial of
marriage to any couple, particularly when the denial of
marriage keeps the couple outside of the legal protection
paradigm and the social welfare system.48 Within current
society, marriage immediately brings a couple into a different
48

See Jean L. Cohen, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL
PARADIGM 6 (2002). (Cohen outlines the history and the recent
adjustment to the idea of regulating intimacy in society:
This mode of regulating intimacy had a clear logic: the
states’ public purpose was to promote heterosexual
marriage and, within that institution, to support
reproductive sexuality and shield the family unit. The
states' privileging of heterosexual monogamous
marriage and the "natural" patriarchal gender order it
institutionalized meant that privacy protection was
limited to the nuclear family unit. The "civil death" of
the married woman—her lack of legal personality and
civic
equality—fit
this
model
perfectly.
Correspondingly, states had considerable freedom to
regulate non- or extramarital intimacies or “public
morals.”
The new constitutional privacy analysis turns this
approach on its head. It articulates the concept of a right
to personal privacy as an individual right of ethical
decisional autonomy (to pursue one's conception of the
good), control over access and personal information,
and a new conception of the scope of individual privacy
that now applies to important aspects of the domain of
morals, formerly the special preserve (along with health
and safety) of state regulation. Id. at 6.).
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protection and welfare umbrella than non-married persons.
Therefore, the public sentiment about marriage must be
viewed objectively. This section attempts to develop a
framework to understand whether society unjustly imposes
moral limits and ethical boundaries on private romantic
relationships. If society does impose such limits, do they
have the right? Can the majority’s rejection of a private
declaration of intimacy be seen as a cost of social outrage
within the contractual framework? Further, does society have
the right to regulate intimacy and define private romantic
relationships?
A.

Public Consequences of Private Intimacy

Marriage is a public act of a private decision between two
individuals. With the progress of society’s liberal ideals, the
individuals involved in marriage do so according to their free
will, without any coercive mechanism at play. Society views
marriage as a culmination of private intimacy between two
consenting adults who want to be bound by the legal
recognition and consequences of marriage. Implicit within
these legal consequences of marriage are the protections of
marriage, such as social welfare protection and benefits of tax
redistribution.
When two individuals enter into a
relationship, there is no limit placed on that relationship from
a social ordering or economic consequences point of view.
However, as soon as the relationship becomes transformed
into marriage, the social order takes over.
Let us consider the human factor to marriage and the
tangible protection measures that come from having the right
to marry. Consider the frightening scenario of two couples,
John and Rosa and Juan and Ryan.
On the historic, horrific morning of September
11, 2001, John kissed his wife, Rosa, goodbye
before heading to his job as an office-cleaner
in the World Trade Center’s North Tower.
Rosa never heard from her husband again.
After searching frantically for days, Rosa
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accepted the reality of his disappearance. She
filed for a death certificate and arranged her
husband’s memorial service. Rosa received
Workers’ Compensation from the state and a
small Social Security death benefit from the
federal government. She contacted John's
former employer, who arranged for receipt of
his pension. Because John and Rosa had few
assets, they had never seen the need for a will,
nor did they have the financial means to hire a
lawyer to prepare one. Nonetheless, John's
assets, which included a small savings
account, their home and a car, were given to
Rosa by law.
That same morning, Juan kissed Ryan, his
partner of 21 years, goodbye and headed to his
job as a file-clerk in that same North Tower.
Like Rosa, Ryan never heard from Juan again.
Ryan applied for Workers’ Compensation and
Social Security, but, unlike Rosa, he was told
he was not eligible for those benefits because
he was not Juan’s legal spouse. Even though
Juan and Ryan had taken some precautions to
protect their commitment — such as
registering as domestic partners, designating
one another as beneficiaries on insurance
policies, and executing health care proxies and
powers of attorney — and even though Juan
paid the same taxes as John, Ryan was not
automatically entitled to any of the
compensations given to Rosa. In addition to
his emotional devastation, Ryan was
financially devastated as well.
Why did Rosa have an economic safety
net, while Ryan did not? The answer can be
summed up in two words: “I do.”
By getting married, John and Rosa gained
access to critical legal protections and benefits
for couples and their children that provided for
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them in their time of need. Married couples
are entitled to literally hundreds of rights and
protections that permeate their financial
relationship,
both
in
extraordinary
circumstances such as the one mentioned
above, or in everyday matters, like simply
renting a car.49
While the couples in this story and the exact details are
set in a hypothetical scenario, the magnitude of extraordinary
difficulties same-sex couples endured are real. Not only were
same-sex couples victims of 9/11, but they did not have the
protection mechanism of marriage.50
Marriage brings with it societal rights and responsibilities,
economic protection, and expectation exposure.
For
example, when an individual earns an income, he or she pays
tax. When two individuals get married, the total tax payment,
in general is less than the sum of the taxes paid as
individuals. This redistribution of tax is seen as an economic
benefit to the marriage and can be seen as a cost to society.51
Therefore, the private individual decision results in a loss of
49

Lambda Legal, Gay Partner of 9/11 Victim Urges California to
Support Freedom to Marry, Feb. 11, 2002, http://www.lambdalegal.org/
news/pr/gay-partner-of-911-victim.html (While the details of this story
are hypothetical, real same-sex couples faced additional hardship because
they were not recognized as married. One such example of a partnership
of 11 years, “A gay California man whose partner died in the September
11 terrorist attacks says the plight he now faces vividly shows why his
home state must allow lesbian and gay couples to marry. Jeff and I got as
close to marriage as we could with our domestic partnership,” according
to Keith Bradkowski. His partner Jeff Collman, was a flight attendant
killed in the attacks. “But it wasn’t protection enough, and now I am
legally vulnerable in ways I never imagined.” Id.).
50
Id.
51
Fitzgerald, supra note 30. See also Liz Pulliam Weston, The Myth
of the Marriage Penalty, available at http://moneycentral.msn.com/
content/Taxes/P48908.asp (There are tangible benefits for marriage.
“Despite complaints about higher taxes on married couples, the reality is
that more couples get a bonus when they marry than suffer a penalty. Add
to that legal and financial benefits, and marriage looks like a pretty good
deal.” Id.).
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economic revenue to society.52 Society must recuperate this
loss, in some form, from the married couple. Defining the
exact form and cost to the society is at the heart of much
debate that encompasses the spheres of morality and ethics.
B.

Shaping Intimacy by Social Outrage and
Imposed Morality

Marriage brings with it a protection mechanism within the
established legal doctrines.53 When two individuals get
married, they become subjected to a legal framework
whereby each party inherits a protection mechanism in the
event of the dissolution of the marriage. For example, a
single individual does not have the economic protection of
being taken care of in case he or she loses his or her
livelihood. In the event of a marriage, the more economically
solvent partner becomes economically responsible for taking
care of the less economically solvent partner. This protection
mechanism afforded to the individual members in a marriage
comes via the legal framework created to extend and expand
52

See Muller, supra note 31 (Muller suggests that by granting tax
breaks and legal benefits to the same-sex couple, the government is
giving away economic benefits that are not accompanied with any other
economic benefits and questions the justification of those added expenses
by the government. However, the additional cost borne by the
government in providing tax breaks in a same-sex marriages is more than
compensated by the economic gain obtained via stabilizing families
through the recognition of marriage.). See also M.V. Badgett, The Fiscal
Impact on the State of Vermont of Allowing Same-Sex couples to Marry,
IGLSS Technical Report 98-1, October 1998, available at
http://www.buddybuddy.com/iglss-2.pdf.; Nancy K. Kubasek, Kara
Jennings, & Shannon T. Browne, Fashioning a Tolerable Domestic
Partners Statute in an Environment Hostile to Same-Sex Marriages, 7
LAW & SEXUALITY 55 (1997); Jeffery Escoffier, The Political Economy of
the Closet: Notes Toward an Economic History of Gay and Lesbian Life
Before Stonewall, in HOMO ECONOMICS: CAPITALISM, COMMUNITY, AND
LESBIAN AND GAY LIFE 125 (Amy Gluckman and Betsy Reed eds. 1997).
53
Marriage brings with it a package of legal rights, which will not be
available otherwise. By protection mechanisms, the plethora of benefits
such as health care to tax breaks that are accorded to both spouses within
the marriage. All these rights come via established laws in the jurisdiction
of the married couple’s domicile.
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the institution of marriage within society. Like corporations
that extract economic incentives in the form of tax breaks to
carry out the function of the corporation, there are economic
incentives offered to individuals involved in a marriage.
Whenever a married couple extracts economic benefits, the
net economic benefit to the society as a whole gets reduced.54
However, while the society loses such economic advantage, it
attempts to recoup some other benefit from the individuals
involved in a marriage.55 For example, an unmarried
individual can enter into multiple romantic relationships, as
there is no social outrage cost to pay for it. Whenever the
same individual gets married, they are prevented by society in
entering into any other extra-marital romantic relationships,
as it is frowned upon. Each individual within a marriage
must pay this social outrage cost or the acquiescent to the
morality threshold imposed upon them. Therefore, whenever
private intimacy is sanctified by marriage, society imposes a
cost on the individuals. How far society can go in imposing
that cost, or calculating the rent of social outrage, that must
be paid in order to get married will be considered in the next
section.
All individuals in a marriage pay societal rent for
extracting economic benefits that would not otherwise be
afforded to them.56 Historically, the nature of that societal
54

Existing law provides married couples with a slew of economic
benefits. These benefits are too numerous to mention. For example, by
being married the couples are entitled to pay less tax compared to what
they would be paying calculated separately. Since tax revenue goes
towards social welfare, the loss of revenue reflects as net economic loss to
the society.
55
Same-sex couples would lose economic benefit from welfare
disbursement as a result of obtaining marriage licenses. For a discussion
on economic impact related to welfare disbursement, see NJ Domestic
Partnership Act, supra note 21. See also HYLAND, supra note 21.
56
When we live in a society, we have to abide by some of society’s
norms. These norms sometimes could impinge upon our personal
preferences, restricting our freedom of choice and liberty of expression.
Therefore, one prerequisite for being part of a society is suppressing one’s
deeper desires and intimate romantic aspirations. Being subjected to this
suppression is equivalent to paying a societal rent. Since only
heterosexuals are allowed to be part of a married community, the societal
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rent or cost that must be extracted by the said individuals has
been an issue of heated debate.57 This debate stems from the
societal conception of morality, ethics, and publicly
sanctioned behavior. As society evolved through the ages,
certain unacceptable behavior became acceptable and
previously frowned upon practices gained societal approval.
While the loss of societal outrage is defined by the
parameters society sets upon the individuals, it is still
embedded within the limits of the majority’s version of
morality.58 This threshold of morality has been created
rent is the suppression of same-sex orientation. By paying that rent,
persons can get the privilege of marriage right.
57
Here, societal rent is the suppression of same-sex desires. Same-sex
marriage debate has been taking center stage for quite sometime.
Extracting that rent means taking an opposing view of granting marriage
rights to same-sex couples.
58
See The Moral Majority Coalition, http://www.moralmajority.com/.
(An example of a majority view agenda is the political organization
founded in 1979, the Moral Majority, which pursued a campaign theme of
conservative evangelical Christian agenda. The Moral Majority was led
for many years by televangelist Jerry Falwell. The organization’s political
agenda focused on upholding Christian conservative ideology of the
moral law. The organization officially dissolved in 1989, but found a new
face, and a new name under the leadership of another televangelist Pat
Robertson. Some of the main campaign issues were outlawing abortion,
opposition to state recognition and acceptance of homosexuality, and
elimination of homosexuals. Prior to his death, Reverend Falwell had
said: “[W]e must stop the homosexuals dead in their tracks — before
they get one step further towards warping the minds of our youth."
Reverend Falwell, Moral Majority Fundraiser, (Apr. 1, 1981) available at
http://www.right wingwatch.org/2007/05/rev_jerry_falwe.html); He also
stated:
In my age, we laughed at queers, fairies, and anyone
who was thought to be a homosexual. It was a hideous
thing, and no one talked about it, much less ever
confessed to being a homosexual... I believe the United
States will be destroyed if we permit homosexuality as
an alternative lifestyle.
Reverend Falwell, How You Can Help Clean Up America available
at http://www.rightwingwatch.org/2007/05/rev_jerry _falwe.html. The
Reverend Falwell further stated, “Can you imagine a regiment of
homosexual men and lesbian women leading an assault on the Red
Army? How much respect would the Communists have for such a
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through centuries of prevalent practices and sociological
developments. In my view, this threshold of morality has
been established without explicitly understanding all facets of
intimate human behavioral patterns including those that are
socially innocuous innate human desires. Who then, is the
arbiter of the social outrage cost that must be borne by the
participants of marriage? Does society have the right to
impose limits on human intimate behavior, and dictate the
terms of private human intimacy?
I will concede that society must extract a cost, when
private intimate desires are brought under the purview of
public consequences, because it allows for legal protection
and social welfare to work for the participants of the
marriage.
This is also consistent from a traditional,
sociological perspective, as societies have imposed limits of
private behavior on marriage. When married individuals
derive economic benefits via participating in the legal
framework, the participants should require a cost that is
implicit within the economic theory of a cost-benefit analysis.
Earlier, this article argued that the economic framework of
the institution of marriage is sustainable without explicit
identification of gender involved in such unions. This nongender centric view of marriage must therefore be studied in
the context of social outrage. As society cannot, however,
extract cost from marriage by imposing gender-specific
sanctions in a marriage.
The limits that society can impose on the institution of
marriage have a deep-rooted significance within the religious,
sociological, and historical point of view. Whenever private
individual behavior crosses the threshold of such societal
sanctioned norms, outrage is created. If the collective
outrage is such that, it signals the signs of breakdown of the
traditions of a civilized society, the cost becomes too much to
pay for the individuals.

collection of perverts." Reverend Falwell, Billings (MT) Gazette, (Mar.
11, 1981) available at http://www.rightwingwatch.org/2007/05/rev_jerry
_falwe.html).
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For example, if a 30-year old man intends to marry an 8year old girl,59 the societal outrage cost will be too high for
the individuals to pay and thus they will not be allowed to
enter a marriage. On the other hand, if a 90-year old man
intends on getting married to a 20-year old girl,60 the outrage
cost may be high due to the repugnant nature of such
behavior, but not high enough to disallow the marriage to go
forward. Similarly, there are heterosexual couples separated
by more than two generations of chronological age that can
enter into marriage, and the institution of marriage is able to
withstand the social outrage. Why then must same-sex
individuals, driven by love for each other, desiring to
continue their life jointly, be confronted with such societal
outrage costs that they cannot marry?
Sociological development over time exhibits evidence of
society’s implicit approval of various intimate behaviors.
There is biological evidence61 that supports the assertion that
the attraction towards members of the same sex is inherent

59

In this example, it would be illegal to marry or have a relationship
with a child of such age. Age of consent laws have varied by state, but
have been passed to deter adults from entering into marriage or any sexual
relationships with people underage. See generally State Age of Sexual
Consent Laws, available at http://www.actwin.com/eatonohio/
gay/consent.htm. See also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. ch 21(Vernon 2007)
available at http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/docs/PE/content/htm/pe.
005.00.000021.00.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
60
In this example, it is not illegal to engage in sexual relationship or
to marry. But, examples exist where society has rejected these
relationships as authentic. A publicized relationship in this context was
the marriage between eighty-nine year old billionaire J. Howard Marshall
II in 1994 to Anna Nicole Smith when she was twenty-six years old. See
Charles Lane, Anna Nicole Smith's Supreme Fight: Justices Hear
Celebrity's Bid for Cut of Late Husband's Riches, WASH. POST, Mar. 1,
2006, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/28/AR2006022800142_pf.html (Last visited
Oct. 13, 2007).
61
On the topic of homosexuality, there are strong sentiments both for
and against. This is a behavior that can no longer be denied or labeled as a
mental health issue. To consider the biological aspect of homosexuality,
see generally J.M. Bailey & R.C. Pillard, A genetic study of male sexual
orientation, 48 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 12, 1089-96 (1991).
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and not driven by aberration or psychological mental health
issues.62 Rather, homosexuality is viewed:
Like all complex behavioral and mental states,
homosexuality
is…neither
exclusively
biological nor exclusively psychological, but
results from an as-yet-difficult-to-quantitate
mixture of genetic factors, intrauterine
influences...postnatal environment (such as
parent, sibling and cultural behavior), and a
complex series of repeatedly reinforced
choices occurring at critical phases of
development.63
If society’s goal is to allow individuals to prosper and
continue their lives within a collective environment bound by
contractual arrangements, society must collect rent in return.
When individuals get societal protection in exchange for
affordable rent to society, creating rent surplus for certain
62

For many years the psychiatric community had been labeling
homosexuality as a sexual disorder. However, based in part on research
and on-going study of homosexual individuals the “APA removed
homosexuality from DSM-III in 1973; with the 1987 publication of DSMIII-R, ego-dystonic homosexuality was deleted as well. Thus,
homosexuality is no longer considered an illness.” See Richard A. Isay,
M.D., Remove Gender Identity Disorder From DSM, Psychiatric News
Viewpoints, http://www.psych.org/pnews/97-11-21/isay.html.
63
JEFFREY SATINOVER, M.D., HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE POLITICS OF
TRUTH, 8 (1996) (The research on homosexuality or same-sex attraction is
ongoing and there are no absolute explanations why some individuals are
attracted to members of the same-sex. This article is not intended to
provide scientific evidence explaining same-sex attraction. Same-sex
attraction as a substantial number of individuals in the homosexual
community have proven, they are law abiding, educated, mentally stable,
and contribute to the welfare of the nation; and could not be viewed as a
deviant sub-culture of the society. It is also interesting to note, under the
U.S. Military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, unless a solider
announces his sexual affinity, there is no way to determine which solider
is homosexual or heterosexual and are allowed to serve the nation). See
also Gregory M. Herek, Ph.D., Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Revisited,
University
of
California
(2006),
available
at
http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/ rainbow/html/military.html.
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members of the society is not equitable nor is it justified.
Here, denial of marriage rights of equality to certain members
of society can be seen as imposing a high rent for providing
them the protection umbrella of marriage. The argument that
society cannot continue to impose such high rent on
individuals, leads to the conclusion that marriage rights
should be extended to same-sex couples. Furthermore,
societal outrage analysis of marriage reveals that, denial of
marriage rights to same-sex couples is not based on any
fundamental belief. Instead, it is borne out of an exclusionary
philosophy of denial of equal rights.
C.

Regulating Intimacy or Limiting Private
Desires

By deciding to live in a society, individuals implicitly
enter into a contract to abide by some of the society rules and
regulations. Implicit within the limits of ordered society,
resides a conglomeration of thresholds that shape the patterns
of society sanctioned intimate behaviors.64 Though evidence
of individuals of same-sex relationships has been in existence
since the birth of civilization, this intimate behavior has not
received the sanction of a marriage. Does society have the
right to regulate such intimate behavior, particularly when
these intimate behaviors are not impinging on others’
exercise of free will, and are not inconsistent with biological
or social behaviors witnessed throughout the ages all over the
world?65
64

In this context, thresholds refer to the barriers to individual
freedoms. These barriers shape the socially accepted behavior based on
majority’s acceptance. Although individual members of the society are
predominantly free to act, they cannot always do what they want.
Similarly, a threshold has been placed on the right to marry. When a
person is legally permissible to marry only the members of opposite sex,
there is a threshold placed on that person. By not allowing the individual
to marry the person of her choice, the threshold is not only limiting her
behavior but also developing a predictable pattern.
65
See Paul Halsall, Homosexuality in History: A Partially Annotated
Bibliography, Version 3.12, Sept 7, 2000, available at
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/pwh/gayhistbib.html#c3.
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How does society regulate intimacy? Most individuals
within a society try to adhere to the limits of socially
sanctioned behavior for fear of outrage or societal backlash.66
Often times, an individual realizes early in his life that he is
attracted to the members of the same-sex, but understands the
public shame that is placed upon such behavior. Thus, he
intentionally hides his sexual feelings and suppresses his
pursuit of finding a partner of his choice and settles in a more
socially acceptable behavior of getting married with a
woman. Is this not intimate behavior being limited by
society?67
Earlier this article explained how private intimate
behavior and romantic desires get sanctioned by marriage. It
is, therefore, most individuals’ objective, in some form or
other, to bring their private desires into the public eye,
thereby finding legitimacy in their existence. If, however,
some individuals are prevented from bringing their private
romantic aspirations into the collective sphere of societal
acceptance for fear of being unacceptable, isn’t this society
regulating intimate behavior? Especially, if the intimate
behavior in question is not harming anyone, not sanctioning
such relationships should be considered the real social
outrage, rather than the pursuit of such relationships.
Therefore, by not legalizing the marriage between same-sex
consenting adults that choose to be in intimate relationships,
is indeed proving that society regulates intimacy. On the
other hand, merely not legalizing such marriage is in no way
limiting privacy. The rights to privacy are not implicit in its
recognition of a marriage, but reside in its explicit ability to
carry out such behavior without fear of legal consequences.
Finally, as society evolves where the frontiers of privacy,
individual liberty, and free choice, have been extended much
more than before, it is to the ultimate benefit of society not to
66

See generally Ann Ferguson, Gay Marriage: An American and
Feminist Dilemma, 22 HYPATIA 1, 39-57 (2007).
67
See Complete Works of Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, supra note
1. (Like the Romeo and Juliet saga, societal disapproval, family
disapproval, and legal disapproval prevent individuals from publicly
proclaiming their love in a recognized union of marriage).
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impose artificial limits of acceptable behavior. This is
especially true if such behavior is born out of a flawed
concept of morality or emerges as a derivative of the
majority’s morality injected into the minority. History has
proven that repression of individuals does no good for
society, as repressed individuals do not contribute fully to the
welfare of collective advancement.68 Regulation of intimacy
or imposing artificial limits represses individuals. Therefore,
society must advance and do away with such regulatory
mechanisms and allow individual expression of sexual
orientation to flourish as long as such expression is centered
on harmless loving behavior.
IV.

CREATION OF
AND BEYOND

NEW RIGHTS: PROMISE

OF

LAWRENCE

As we enter the early phase of the 21st century, we are
emboldened by the expansion of individual liberty and rights
of privacy in vast aspects of life. Yet, the marriage rights for
same-sex couples remain a distant dream due to judicial nonacknowledgement in most parts of the nation. Amidst a lot of
soul-searching and warring factions trumpeting their
justifications on various grounds, same-sex couples have not
achieved marriage equality, with the exception of
Massachusetts whose highest court has granted same-sex
couples the right to marry. The issue of same-sex marriage
has percolated through the state and federal court systems.69
This contentious issue has been debated on various grounds
from suspect class,70 to the Equal Protection Clause,71 to
68

I have discussed in detail the role repression plays in impacting an
individual and how the relationships among repression, collective
mechanism, and society eventually shape the development of societal
standards and collective aspirations. See Saby Ghoshray, Chapter
Fourteen: Symmetry, Rationality and Consciousness: Revisiting
Marcusean Repression in America’s War on Terror, Eros and Liberation:
Herbert Marcuse’s Vision For A New Era, Penn State University Press,
2006 (Forthcoming).
69
See cases cited supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
70
A particular group of people could be considered members of a
“suspect class” if law categorizes them as suspect and therefore provides
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them with greater judicial scrutiny. The issue of whether to make the
members of the same-sex community a suspect class depends on whether
homosexuality can be considered an immutable behavior or a matter of
choice. Scientific evidence has demonstrated that attraction to members of
same-sex is in part biologically based, yet the judiciary has historically
denied the “suspect class” status on the homosexuals. Historically, the
Supreme Court has been unwilling to extend “suspect class” status to
groups other than women and racial minorities. See City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-47 (1985) (the Court
refused to make the developmentally disabled a suspect class. Justice
Marshall noted in his partial concurrence in City of Cleburne that the
Court does appear to examine the City of Cleburne's denial of a permit to
a group home for mentally retarded people with a significantly higher
degree of scrutiny than is typically associated with the rational-basis test.
Id. at 447-50.). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (The
Court revisited the issue of “suspect class” again here, where it struck
down a Texas statute prohibiting homosexual sodomy on substantive due
process grounds. By taking resort to the development in the City of
Cleburne, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted in her concurring opinion,
that by prohibiting only homosexual sodomy, and not heterosexual
sodomy as well, Texas’s statute did not meet rational-basis review under
the Equal Protection Clause. Justice O’Connor may have applied a
slightly higher level of scrutiny than mere rational basis, but the Court as
a whole did not really extend suspect-class status to sexual orientation. In
her opinion in Lawrence, Justice O’Connor also relied on the Court’s
decision in Romer v. Evans (1996) that struck down a Colorado
constitutional amendment aimed at denying homosexuals “minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or [a] claim of discrimination.”
O’Connor’s invocation of Romer is significant as Romer seemed to
employ a markedly higher level of scrutiny than the nominal application
of the rational-basis test. Id.)
Based on the current composition of the Court, it is highly probable,
therefore, that the Court may not explicitly apply heightened scrutiny to
homosexuals any time soon, although it may decide about the
constitutionality of laws prohibiting the same-sex marriages. It has also
been argued that discrimination based on sex should be interpreted to
include discrimination based on sexual orientation, in which case
intermediate scrutiny (higher level of scrutiny than mere rational basis
test) could apply to same-sex rights cases. Just recently, the Supreme
Court of the state of Washington went out of its way to declare members
of the homosexual community not a minority, homosexuality not an
immutable characteristic, homosexuals not a suspect class. The court
states, “The plaintiffs have not established that they are members of a
suspect class or that they have a fundamental right to marriage that
includes the right to marry a person of the same sex.” See Heather
Andersen and Leslie Christian, et. al. v. King County, State of
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fundamental rights of the rational basis,72 and still the judicial
prohibitions on same-sex marriage remain the same. Several
states have come quite close to bringing marriage rights to
same-sex couples, but still remain unconsummated.73
Consider a very poignant question: Would the judiciary ever
end the legal prohibitions on same-sex marriage? Same-sex
couples are everywhere; we interact with them everyday.
They are our neighbors, our colleagues, our priests, and our
soldiers.74 We find same-sex couples even among the highest
offices within our government. A compassionate father,
Vice-President Dick Cheney states, “Lynne and I have a gay
Washington, et. al, No. 75934-1 (July 26, 2006) (Justice Barbara A.
Madsen majority opinion) available at http://www.courts.wa.
gov/newsinfo/content/pdf/759341opn.pdf (the debate over whether or not
members of the same-sex community are a suspect class is far from over).
71
U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV (The doctrine of “equal protection"
states that any law that is otherwise constitutional, is a valid law and
therefore, must be applied equally to all persons. Sometimes, however,
this equal application of law results in asymmetrical and unequal
outcomes for various identifiable groups. A question repeatedly raised is,
how to achieve the intended meaning of "equal protection" so that
everyone is entitled to the same outcome. Relying on this "equal
protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, some jurisdictions give
same-sex spouses the same access to his or her "partner's" company's
health-insurance plan as a spouse in a traditional marriage. However, the
judiciary is still far removed from applying this doctrine universally in
recognizing a same-sex marriage on the same basis as traditional
marriage.)
72
See Ghoshray, supra note 68.
73
See Status of Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 9, and accompanying
text.
74
See Lewis, 188 N.J. at 453 (The Supreme Court:
Gays and lesbians work in every profession, business,
and trade. They are educators, architects, police
officers, fire officials, doctors, lawyers, electricians, and
construction workers. They serve in township boards, in
civic organizations, and in church groups that minister
to the needy. They are mothers and fathers. They are
our neighbors, our co-workers, and our friends. In light
of the policies reflected in the statutory and decisional
laws of this State, we cannot find a legitimate public
need for an unequal legal scheme of benefits and
privileges that disadvantages committed same-sex
couples. Id.
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daughter, so it’s an issue our family is very familiar with.
With the respect to the question of relationships, my general
view is freedom means freedom for everyone. ... People
ought to be free to enter into any kind of relationship they
want to.”75 Shouldn’t we listen to this father’s appeal to
recognize his daughter’s right to marry? Why then, are they
not recognized as married couples in the majority of the
country? What will it take to recognize the rights of samesex couples to marry? Does it require the creation of new
constitutional rights hitherto unrecognized? Will these rights
ever be validated via a legislative process? Can our two
hundred year old Constitution comprehend the expansive
meaning of intimacy and love in the 21st century? Answers
to these profound questions of law, fundamental values,
legality, and matters of the heart will be explored in the next
section.
A.

Creation of New Rights or Going Beyond
Unenumerated Rights

Despite making tremendous inroads in expanding their
rights in the last two decades, the proponents of same-sex
rights are yet to receive the ultimate recognition: The
recognition sanctified by marriage. Since the landmark 1986
Supreme Court decision of Bowers v. Hardwick,76 which
upheld a Georgia State Law77 prohibiting homosexual
75

See Associated Press, Cheney At Odds with Bush on Gay Marriage,
(Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5817720/.
76
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (noting that the denial of homosexual rights was based on a
careful consideration of historic tradition, in which states consistently
intervened in homosexual conduct on the grounds of moral and ethical
standards). Cf. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). (dismissing Chief Justice Burger’s reasoning
on grounds of historical inaccuracy and improper relevance. In Lawrence,
Justice Kennedy explained that historical traditions could be taken into
consideration only up to a certain extent, echoing his earlier findings in
Lewis. Id. (discussing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72)).
77
See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy law, which criminalized oral and

2007

Dual Rationality of Same-Sex Marriage

95

sodomy, both sides of this same-sex marriage debate have
been active. On one side, the opponents of same-sex rights,
through their elected national and state legislatures have
attempted to retain the traditional definition of marriage, first
through the passage of federal and state Defense of Marriage
Acts (DOMA),78 and recently through the legislative process
of the National Elections held November 2, 2004. These
elections resulted in 11 states voting to amend their
Constitutions and ban same-sex marriage.79
The amendments won, often by huge margins,
in Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan,
Mississippi,
Montana,
North
Dakota,
Oklahoma, Ohio, Utah and Oregon — the one
state where gay-rights activists hoped to
prevail. The bans won by a 3-to-1 margin in

anal sex between consenting adults.) But cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558
(holding that such sodomy laws were unconstitutional).
78
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (codified
at 1 U.S.C. §7, 28 U.S.C. §1738C) (The DOMA is a federal law designed
to give states the right to refuse recognition of a same-sex marriage
approved by another state. It also defines marriage as a union between a
man and woman for the purposes of federal law. The Act was introduced
by Republican Rep. Bob Barr of Georgia, in May 1996. The bill passed
both the House of Representatives and the Senate and later President
Clinton signed the bill on Sept. 21, 1996. The Act focuses on two key
components. The first, is the authority given to states, that “No state,
territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of
any other state, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other state, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim
arising from such relationship.” Id. §1783C. The second component deals
with the federal definition of marriage as an institution between one man
and one woman, with the word "spouse" referring only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or wife, Id. §7(a)).
79
See Rona Marech, The Battle Over Same-Sex Marriage: One Year
Later Both sides claim victory, but courts will decide, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Feb. 12, 2005, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/02/12/MNG8ABA7RC1.DTL.
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Kentucky and Georgia, 3-to-2 in Ohio, and 6to-1 in Mississippi.80
On the other side, the same-sex rights advocates have
gone through the reversal of Bowers and through a series of
court decisions that nearly opened the door to gain full
equality in marriage rights, as they journeyed from tolerance
to acceptance, to public endorsement.81
While the
continuation of denying same-sex marriage rights was
disheartening, it still remains an issue in the forefront of
same-sex couple’s dialogue and continues seeking equality.
As we look beneath the surface and examine the Supreme
Court’s decision on same-sex rights, the apparent reversal of
same-sex rights in Bowers was an aberration in the Court’s
continuous expansion of the frontiers of individual rights and
privacy. The journey began in Griswold v. Connecticut, 82 in
which the Court extended the limits of intimacy and rights of
consenting adults, unlocking the door to sexual pleasure and

80

Associated Press, Campaign 2004: 11 States Ban Same-Sex Marriage,
CBS News Nov. 2, 2004, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2004/09/30/politics/main646662.shtml.
81
Same-sex couples still struggle to gain tolerance, acceptance or
even approval by society. A recent poll details that “… of 1,002 adults
May 8-11 shows that by a 58-39 percent margin American adults oppose
redefining marriage to include homosexuals. Additionally, 50 percent
favor and 47 percent oppose a marriage amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.” See Michael Foust, Gallup poll: 58 percent oppose 'gay
marriage,' half support amend, Baptist Press, May 22, 2006, available at
http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=23295.
82
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding the
constitution protects the right to privacy. The ruling was based on an 1879
Connecticut law, which prohibited the use of contraceptives or drugs that
were for the sole purpose of preventing conception. Justice Goldberg
wrote a concurring opinion, relying on the Ninth Amendment to support
his findings. Justice Harlan wrote a concurring opinion in which he relied
on the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause. Justice
Byron White also relied on the due process clause in his concurring
opinion.); See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that abortion
was a private decision between a woman and her doctor. For the most
part, the Court in the subsequent rulings relied on Justice Harlan's
substantive due process opinion).
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sexual release between married couples.83
Thus, by
separating the procreative idealism of marriage from the right
to intimacy, the Court opened up a new frontier to expand the
definition of marriage in the first place. The Court extended
the right to privacy to unmarried couples while untangling
“private sin” from “public crime” in Eisenstadt v. Baird.84
Although, the Court was quick, during this long march to
liberation, to separate procreative and unitary idealism of
marriage for sex, it took longer to extend these rights to
same-sex couples. The Court needed a deeper understanding
of the human person, the complexities of human
anthropology, as it revealed in the poignant “mystery
passage” of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,85 where it held:
These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.86
83

See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., Concurring
Opinion).
84
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding that a
Massachusetts law which criminalized the distribution of contraceptives
to unmarried people was unconstitutional).
85
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of Pennsylvania laws
regulating abortion. The Court held the right to have an abortion and
lowered the standard on the restrictions of that right).
86
Id. at 851. See also Kevin J. Hasson, God and Man at the Supreme
Court: Rethinking Religion in Public Life, The Heritage Foundation, Oct.
14, 1997, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Religion/
HL599.cfm (Much has been written about this opinion and the inner
message of Justice Kennedy's words. These words provide a glance into
the Supreme Court’s thoughts. It can be argued however, Justice
Kennedy, like the early philosophers Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre,
is the present day philosopher. His rulings are formed on the
“predominant assumptions about the great ideas—about God and man,
about the nature of society and the state, of freedom and responsibility,
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Perhaps this deeper understanding of human existence
could have helped the Court in making its decisions to
provide them with the rights that adult married and unmarried
heterosexuals have taken for granted for decades.
The journey from Bowers to Lawrence was a predictable
one. In his Bowers dissent, Justice Blackmun almost derived
Lawrence’s constitutionally protected enumerated right from
Griswold’s interpretation of fundamental rights:
The fact that individuals define themselves in
a significant way through their intimate sexual
relationships with other suggests, in a Nation
as diverse as ours, that there may be many
‘right’ ways of conducting their relationships,
and that much of the richness of a relationship
will come from the freedom an individual has
to choose the form and nature of these
intensely personal bonds.87
Justice Stevens concluded Justice Blackmun’s unfinished
business by explicitly linking a married couple’s right to
engage in non-procreative sex with partners of the same-sex
having intimate sexual encounters; “The essential ‘liberty’
that animated the development of the law in cases like
Griswold and Eisenstadt … surely embraces the right to
engage in non-reproductive, sexual conduct that others may
consider offensive or immoral.”88 The promise of Lawrence,
however, remains unfulfilled, as we continue to search for
equality in the right to choose one’s partner for marriage,
long after having attained the equality of right to engage in
sexual intimacy.

and so forth.” Further, “America's public philosophy is uniquely
influenced by Supreme Court decisions.” Id. But, there are naysayer’s that
discount the substantive nature of his opinion and dismiss it as mere
judicial hubris.).
87
See Ghoshray, supra note 68, at 205.
88
Id. at 217.
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By delving into the framework of enumerated rights of
the Constitution, the unfulfilled promise of Lawrence to bring
marriage equality for same-sex couples becomes more
transparent. If Lawrence has settled the issue of same-sex
intimacy under the premise of enumerated rights, then why
can’t the same enumerated rights doctrine be extended to
those seeking the rights to marry their same-sex partner? On
the surface, it seems that an originalist’s viewpoint would be
that same-sex marriage rights are not necessarily protected by
the Constitution under the enumerated rights doctrine. This is
because the originalist interpretation of the Constitution
mandates, protecting those rights, which are actually located
in the Constitution.89
A more dynamic constitutional
interpretation,90 however, would suggest a different
89

See Saby Ghoshray, To Understand Foreign Court Citation:
Dissecting Originalism, Dynamism, Romanticism, and Consequentialism,
69 ALB. L. REV. 709 (2006) (detailing the various shades and hues of
originalist interpretation of the Constitution).
90
Here we are confronted with the issue of strict constructionist vs.
dynamic
constitutional
interpretation.
Dynamic
constitutional
interpretation argues for the need to expand the meaning of constitutional
clauses as a result of changing values and complex sociological
dimensions. The changing realities based on the evolving nature of our
understanding of human existence makes it incumbent upon all of us to
extricate ourselves from the frozen, static-in-time version of the
Constitution to embrace a more dynamic Constitution. By referring to a
dynamic Constitution, attention is drawn to the process by which the
Constitution adapts to the changing conditions in the society. As the
frontiers of the freedom of speech, the freedom of religion, the rights to
privacy and sexual practices among consenting adults continue to expand
within the meaning of our Constitution, we are confronted with its
dynamic aspect. In most parlances, the dynamic Constitution and the
living Constitution is used synonymously. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., THE
DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-2, 12-13, 269 (2004). See also Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958) (The term living is used to denote that the
Constitution is still evolving in consonance with the evolving needs of the
society, rather than possessing a fixed in time, definitive meaning. The
concept of a living Constitution is noted by the Court in Trop: "[T]he
words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is
not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at
100-01 (discussing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). See
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conclusion than that espoused by an originalist, support of
which can be gleaned from an expansive reading of The Bill
of Rights. The Bill of Rights was originally created to protect
liberty from the corrosive impact of any governmental or
republican interference. Implicit in the concept of the Bill of
Rights resides the guarantee that there are some rights so
fundamental, either the government or the legislature can
never regulate them. Therefore, no majority, no matter how
large, could violate the rights of individuals. These are
indeed the enumerated rights.
The framers of the Constitution however agreed that there
could not possibly be an exhaustive list of enumerated rights,
and thus, they created unenumerated rights.91 Could we
also Thurgood Marshall, Justice, United States Supreme Court, Annual
Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association
(May
6,
1987),
available
at
http://www.thurgoodmarshall.
com/speeches/constitutional_speech.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
(The concept of a living Constitution further gained currency in
Marshall’s lecture titled, The Constitution: A Living Document, where he
argued that the Constitution must be interpreted in light of the moral,
political and cultural climate of the age of interpretation.). See also Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, United States Supreme Court, Keynote
Address Before the American Society of International Law Annual
Meeting (Apr. 1, 2005), available at http://www.asil.org/events/
AM05/ginsburg/050401.html. See also Ghoshray, supra note 89, at 10152.
91
The Bill of Rights contained numerous rights called enumerated
rights, which are different than unenumerated rights. While the
enumerated rights are explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the
unenumerated rights have not been explicitly mentioned, but the Supreme
Court had long held that the Constitution protects those rights. The
difficulty in distinguishing between enumerated rights and unenumerated
rights has created significant constitutional confusion. Unenumerated
rights are retained by the people. Commenting on unenumerated rights,
Randy Barnett says, “The purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to ensure
that all [enumerated and unenumerated] individual natural rights had the
same stature and force after some of them were enumerated as they had
before; and its existence argued against a latitudinarian interpretation of
federal powers.” RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2003). See also, JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2006) (1980) (John Hart Ely asserts that these rights come from a broad
principles of democratic process and equality and democratic process.).
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presume that anything that is not explicitly protected by the
Constitution as such is an unenumerated right? Rights not
specifically enumerated therefore, may be limited, or
legislatively rendered insignificant if a majority or their
representatives see fit. What then, is the purpose of the Ninth
amendment?92 According to the Bill of Rights, unenumerated
rights are protected under the Ninth Amendment?93 Does
that mean then these types of rights are subject to the whims
and interpretations of the lawmakers and their governments?
This is absolutely unconscionable, and doing so would render
the entire concept of unenumerated rights meaningless and
interpret the Ninth Amendment as an extra-terrestrial
encroachment into the Constitution. Could the right to marry
by same-sex couples be a good example of unenumerated
liberties within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment? In
this context, when states act to protect liberty, either through
state Constitutions or via legislative measures in the state
legislation, they act to protect rights explicitly recognized
92

See U.S. CONST. Amend. IX (addresses the rights of the people
that are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution. “The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.” Id. See also Griswold, 381 U.S.
at 481 (Justice Arthur Goldberg, Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Brennan expressed the opinion that the Ninth Amendment is relevant to
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment:
[T]he Framers did not intend that the first eight
amendments be construed to exhaust the basic and
fundamental rights.... I do not mean to imply that the ....
Ninth Amendment constitutes an independent source of
rights protected from infringement by either the States
or the Federal Government....While the Ninth
Amendment - and indeed the entire Bill of Rights originally concerned restrictions upon federal power,
the subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the States as well from abridging fundamental
personal liberties. And, the Ninth Amendment, in
indicating that not all such liberties are specifically
mentioned in the first eight amendments, is surely
relevant in showing the existence of other fundamental
personal rights, now protected from state, as well as
federal, infringement. Id.).
93
U.S. CONST. Amend. IX.
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within the Constitution but not created by the Ninth
Amendment. Clearly, the framers believed that every
possible right could be recognized in the Constitution by
means of constitutional interpretation but they cannot be
explicitly created.
Therefore, we are all entitled to
fundamental rights that the government must recognize and
that the purpose of the governments is to protect those rights.
Therefore, all rights are recognized by government, not
created by government.
The challenge with this argument then revolved around
determining what a right is and is not. Otherwise, we create a
situation where anybody who wants to do anything can claim
that they have a right to do so. For example, an individual
could say they have the right to drive with blaring music
pounding through their neighborhood at two a.m. We can
have noise ordinances or driving restrictions to prohibit that,
but the person claiming that right would say, “If I am entitled
to this right, then you can’t pass an ordinance to strip me of
that right.” It would then be up to the courts to decide as to
whether there is a right to an individual to either drive with a
cranked up stereo at two a.m. or there exists no such right.
While the explicitly listed rights are clearly recognized,
there ought to be some adjudication process to determine
what the unlisted rights that can be recognized are. In the
above example, what is going to stop the driver with the
cranked up stereo from asserting his rights, “This is a right
that you must recognize.” Therefore, the challenge comes
from ascertaining what is a legitimate unenumerated right and
what is not. It is against this backdrop that an analysis is
needed to consider the issue of same-sex marriage and the
rights of equality for all couples regardless of their sexual
orientation. Under what circumstances do unenumerated
rights become binding on the government such that the
majority could neither regulate nor violate? How do we go
about discerning between a legitimate and illegitimate
assertion of an unenumerated right? We cannot deny the fact
that there will be disagreements over what is and is not
legitimate. The right of marriage to same-sex couples falls in
that category. Who should be the moral arbiter to determine
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whether this right should be bestowed upon same-sex couples
or not? Who determines if this right is a legitimate right?
The proponents of natural rights believe that all issues of
unenumerated rights must be determined on the basis of
natural rights, the rights that are embedded in the
presumption of liberty.94
Although the Ninth Amendment provides us a protective
umbrella of presumption to all other exercises of liberty, this
presumption of liberty interpretation does not get us close to
an understanding of whether the right to same-sex marriage is
an enumerated right. Otherwise, several state Supreme
Courts would not have denied these equality rights to samesex couples.95
The problem of interpreting the Ninth Amendment arises
from the confusion surrounding the definition of rights,
specifically to know what rights should be protected. Here,
the Ninth Amendment cannot be solely relied on for support
to identify which rights are protected and which rights are
not. Should this then be decided by the judiciary and allow
the Justices the right to pick and choose what rights the Ninth
Amendment covers and what rights it does not? This
94

See BARNETTE, supra note 91 (In his noteworthy commentary,
Randy Barnett describes this presumption of liberty:
As long as they do not violate the rights of others (as
defined by the common law of property, contract and
tort), persons are presumed to be “immune” from
interference by government. This presumption means
that citizens may challenge any government action that
restricts their otherwise rightful conduct, and the burden
is on the government to show that its action is within its
proper powers or scope. At the national level, the
government would bear the burden of showing that its
acts were both “necessary and proper” to accomplish an
enumerated function, rather than, as now, forcing the
citizen to prove why it is he or she should be left alone.
At the state level, the burden would fall upon state
government to show that legislation infringing the
liberty of its citizens was a necessary exercise of its
‘police power’ - that is, the state’s power to protect the
rights of its citizens… Id.
95
Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 645 (1993).
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particular point is to emphasize that the doctrine of
unenumerated rights should be read to interpret that the
government interference in regulating certain individual
liberties should be rejected outright. With this caveat,
however, these individual liberties must not interfere with
other established enumerated rights by other individual
citizens. Several such unenumerated rights have been firmly
established within a broader constitutional interpretation,
although there may not be explicit mention of those rights
within the Constitution.
For example, there is no “right of free association”
enumerated in the Constitution, yet the Courts have long
recognized that there is such a right and no one has
challenged it. Why therefore, can the same not be said about
the right to marry for same-sex couples? Earlier this article
has shown that the law and economic theory of marriage is
not inconsistent with same-sex couples obtaining marriage
rights. The Supreme Court has already established the
uniqueness of human existence and the conception of human
liberty goes far beyond our hackneyed ideals of morality and
contemporary ethics. These liberated ideals and expanded
conceptions of humanity should, therefore, shape our views
on fundamental rights. If we can establish the mutual
exclusivity of the rights of same-sex couples to marry with
other established and recognized individual rights, we have
come far in our explication of the nature of rights for
constitutional adjudication.
The Supreme Court has already taken the procreative
component out of the definition of marriage, and has stripped
the exclusivity component from the rights of enjoying sexual
pleasure. Recently, through Lawrence, the Courts have taken
the provision of the sexual orientation from the rights to
privacy. Providing the right to marry to same-sex couples
will be a continuation of such ideals, which is rightfully
consistent with the last several decades’ constitutional
development in individual rights and privacy. The concept of
unenumerated rights has evolved through various
interpretations, whether in the words of the Framers of the
Constitution about the proper aims and legitimate powers of
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government96 or in the natural rights philosophy based
interpretation of the presumption of liberty.97 Emanating
from these expansive doctrines and liberal ideals is the view
that enumerated rights assertion to the rights to marry by
same-sex couples, is not inconsistent with constitutional
objectives.
Did Thomas Jefferson think that same-sex couples had
rights to marry when he provided us with this eloquent
explication, “[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness?”98 Or, did Mr.
Jefferson, when defining the limits of legitimate law within a
free society, envision that there exists, among us, with
aspirations and human desires, a section of our brethren, who
find themselves hopelessly perched at the outlier of our legal
firmament?
Of liberty I would say that, in the whole
plenitude of its extent, it is unobstructed action
according to our will. But rightful liberty is
unobstructed action according to our will
within limits drawn around us by the equal
rights of others. I do not add ‘within the limits
of the law,’ because law is often but the
96

Such examples of interpretation of the constitution are found in The
Federalist Papers. The authors of the Federalist Papers intended to both
influence ratification and future interpretations of the Constitution. The
original eighty-five articles were compiled and formed the Federalist
Papers, which urged the ratification of the United States Constitution.
They were published beginning in October 1787. The Federalist Papers
serve as an important constitutional interpretive tool, as they outline the
philosophy and motivation of the newly formed government. See Primary
Documents in American History, The Federalist Papers, Library of
Congress, http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html.
97
See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (Supreme Court illuminated this
concept); See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855
(1992).
98
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, pmbl (U.S. 1776), available at
http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document/index.htm.
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tyrant’s will, and always so when it violates
the right of an individual.99
When the Framers penned their thoughts on fundamental
rights, enumerated rights, and unenumerated rights, they were
not oblivious to homosexual behavior, as, homosexuality has
been with humanity since the dawn of time. It is plausible
the Framers could have had a limited scope of understanding
on the biological, physiological, and sociological mechanisms
behind homosexuality, as even in modern times, we struggle
with understanding homosexuality. Nonetheless, they were
not blind to it.
Now, the understanding of human existence, and the
fundamental rights that go to the very core of human
existence have evolved in the last two hundred years since the
Constitution was first enacted. Although this aging document
has done a good job of providing the judiciary the tools to
uphold basic fundamental rights enshrined in the
Constitution, questions could be raised as to whether it is
time to create new rights. It appears we remain hopelessly
deadlocked as to the assertion of unenumerated rights in the
profound issue of extending the equality of marriage rights to
all citizens. We remain fiercely contentious as to how far we
could expand the frontiers of our evolving conceptions of
liberty, privacy, and the rights to intimacy, when it comes to
assert legal acceptance to same-sex couple’s right to the
pursuit of happiness.100 Are legislative changes needed in the
existing constitutional amendments to properly capture the
meaning of human existence as revealed in the mystery of
human life discussed earlier?101 Might this debate be
captured within the evolving constitutional adjudications in
99

See Thomas Jefferson on Politics and Government, Thomas
Jefferson
to
Isaac
H.
Tiffany,
1819,
available
at
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeff0100.htm.
100
By referring to the Jeffersonian spirit embedded in the invocation
of “pursuit of happiness,” the question is whether minorities belonging to
specific sexual orientation could be excluded from attaining that
happiness.
101
This refers to the mystery passage. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
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the legal arena that centers on a debate between originalism
vs. dynamic constitutionalism?102
102

See Ghoshray, supra note 89, at 716-27 (Essentially, Originalism
refers to the Constitutional interpretation that seeks the meaning that was
intended by the Framers for the society when it was written. By
discerning the historical meaning of the terms used—the originalist avoids
any fanciful analysis of the Framers’ mind to uncover a hidden
interpretation. Sometimes the originalist ideology is manifested in its
reliance on textualism, the interpretive process that interprets the law
based on the text and tradition of the Constitution, without focusing on the
moral or intellectual compass of the society or individual. Anchored in
the text, structure, and history of the Constitution, the textualist seeks the
most literal meaning, free from the perceptive idealism of broader social
purpose). See also, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The
Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1510 (1998) (reviewing
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (1997)) (noting how Justice Scalia rejects the use of common
sense principles when the plain language of the rule is clear); Donald J.
Kochan, The Other Side of the Coin: Implications for Policy Formation in
the Law of Judicial Interpretation, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 463,
464–66 (1997); Larry Kramer, Judicial Asceticism, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
1789, 1790–92 (1991) (discussing Justice Scalia’s deep commitment to a
formalist jurisprudence). By referring to a dynamic Constitution, attention
is drawn to the process by which the Constitution adapts to the changing
conditions in society. As the frontiers of the freedom of speech, the
freedom of religion, the rights to privacy and sexual practices among
consenting adults continue to expand within the meaning of our
Constitution, we are confronted with its dynamic aspect. In most
parlances, the phrases “dynamic Constitution” and “living Constitution”
are used synonymously. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 3–4 (2001) (explaining that the
Constitution provides principles that the Court identifies and implements
“through a highly moralized, philosophic inquiry According to Justice
Ginsburg, the Constitution ought to be read as belonging to a global
twenty-first century, not as fixed forever by eighteenth century
understandings). See Ginsburg, (Apr. 1, 2005), supra note 90 (quoting
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920), Justice Ginsburg invokes
the immortal words of Justice Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr.:
[W]hen we are dealing with words . . . [in] the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that
they have called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the
most gifted of its begetters. . . . The case before us must
be considered in the light of our whole experience and
not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.
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Marriage rights for same-sex couples have been debated
for several decades without judicial validation. Does it then
require the creation of new enumerated rights, such that the
fundamental nature of that right is so profound that denial of
such right will pass the “shock and conscience” test103 of the
constitutional adjudication? To give a marriage right to any
minority member of society does not require the creation of
new rights, it requires keeping the implicit promise of
guarantying fundamental rights to all citizens. It requires
delving into the bottomless crevices of the Constitution’s
expansive meaning, a meaning that must evolve with the
time.
As the understanding of human nature has evolved so has
the appreciation for individual human desires and aspirations.
This allowed the broadening of frontiers of privacy rights, as
seen over three decades of settled law in Bowers being
invalidated in Lawrence.
The journey that began in
Griswold, opening the door to privacy rights, continued on in
Roe v. Wade,104 creating a newer enumerated right of
reproduction for women. Thus, the arrival of Lawrence was
no judicial accident, rather the culmination of a historical
journey by the American judiciary into the expansive domain
of bringing recognition to individual private desires and
romantic aspirations. That the implicit promise of Lawrence
has not yet materialized into procuring marriage rights for
same-sex couples is disheartening, but not shocking.
Although Lawrence provided a renewed appreciation of the
anthropological complexities of human kind and provided us

103

See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (The
‘shock and conscience’ test was popularized after Justice Felix
Frankfurter writing for the U.S. Supreme Court established the ‘shockthe-conscience test’, based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition
against states depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.” This test attempts to determine whether an
action/behavior fall outside the standards of civilized decency. The test,
however, has its distracters that criticize permitting judges to assert their
individual views on what constitutes shocking).
104
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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with a deeper understanding of substantive due process,105 it
did not solve the constitutional inadequacies of separating
enumerated rights from the unenumerated rights. Looking
into the historical evolution of constitutional jurisprudence
surrounding private rights and public acceptance, I see no
reason why provisions of marriage for same-sex couples
should not be lifted on multiple grounds. It is not the
majority’s opinion that should be counted while deciding
matters of grave public interest, rather the consistency in the
direction of change that must be taken into consideration as
held by Justice Stevens who eloquently articulated a newer
national consensus standard based on the “consistency of the
direction of change that has been demonstrated in Roper v.
Simmons.”106
If the current framework of rights, fundamental or
enumerated, is too narrow to legitimize marriage rights for
same-sex couples, the alternatives must be sought to create a
105

See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); For a
further explanation on Substantive Due Process, see Wikipedia, Due
Process:
Substantive
Due
Process
Basics,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Due_process [follow “Substantive Due
Process Basics” link] (The legal description of Substantive Due Process is
the fundamental constitutional legal theory upon which many privacy
rights are based. The doctrine of Substantive Due Process holds that the
Due Process Clause not only requires “due process,” that is, basic
procedural rights, but that it also protects basic substantive rights.
“Substantive” rights are those general rights that reserve to the individual
the power to possess or to do certain things, despite the government’s
desire to the contrary. These are rights, like freedom of speech and
religion. “Procedural” rights are special rights that, instead, dictate how
the government can lawfully go about taking away a person’s freedom or
property or life, when the law otherwise gives them the power to do so.
Modern substantive due process doctrine protects such
rights as the right to privacy, under which falls rights of
bodily autonomy, private sexual activity (Lawrence v.
Texas), contraception (Griswold v. Connecticut), and
abortion (Roe v. Wade), as well as most of the
protections of the Bill of Rights. However, what are
seen as failures to protect enough of our basic liberties
and what are seen as past abuses and present excesses
of this doctrine continue to spur debate over its use. Id.)
106
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 559 (2005).
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new set of constitutional rights. To ensure equality amongst
all members of society, we must not fret over the explicit
creation of new rights, as long as that right does not infringe
on other fundamental rights. Obviously, as we evolve as a
society where multitude of diverging interests and desires
interact with renewed aspirations and empowerment, the
societal fabric may always be confronted with new
challenges.
As long as the developments of new
empowerment are not in direct conflict of other fundamental
rights, we must not vacillate from the path of creation of such
newer fundamental rights. Implicit in these new rights, reside
the promise of equality for all.
B.

Judiciary vs. Legislature: Who Decides?

The recent New Jersey ruling in Lewis v. Harris and the
subsequent legislative development brings the realization that
the right to marry by the same-sex couple might indeed come
down to a legislative decision, as the judiciary becomes
increasingly apprehensive of ruling against settled law in the
land. The problem with this scenario is that it will almost
certainly become impossible in America for any legislature to
lift the provision against same-sex marriage and grant
marriage rights to same-sex couples. This is where the
futility of exploring legislative avenues in securing this
important fundamental right lies.
The issue must be analyzed in two threads. First, an
explicit determination must be made as to whether this is a
legislative right or a judicial constitutional right. This issue is
intrinsically linked to the resolution of who can create new
rights. Second, we must be cognizant of the practical
limitations under which the legislative branch works. The
right to marry by any individual is a fundamental right deeply
ingrained in the humanities eternal yearning to be equal and
to be recognized. The right to marry is a fundamental human
right, and no fundamental human right is based on the gender
of that individual. Therefore, the issue is not who grants or
determines such rights, rather why that right remained
unattainable to a sizable portion of the population.
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Furthermore, the right to marry must be determined through
the judicial process, as the legislature is hopelessly ill
equipped to deal with such a deeply fundamental matter of
personal rights and private matters.
Implicit in the
recognition of our private intimate matters comes prejudicial
predisposition and religious underpinnings. As a result, the
general public is divided in their opinion on this issue and the
political process is dependant on the majority’s view.
However, it is not the majority’s view that must be adhered to
in this context; rather a significant directional change should
be the indicator of change.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article deconstructs the traditional view of marriage
as an opposite-sex only union and presents a nexus of
contract interpretations of marriage, which supports the right
of same-sex couples to marry. Detouring away from the
hackneyed ideals of marriage, marriage equality must be
extended to all people regardless of sexual orientation.
Examining the economic realities of marriage, there is no
budgetary hurdle that justifies keeping the same-sex couples
outside of the protective umbrella of marriage. All empirical
evidence provides strong indication that society can extract
net economic gain by extending marriage rights to its samesex couples.
Extending the theory of contract to define marriage, the
institution of marriage is structurally similar to the nexus of
contract arrangements of a corporation, and as a result its
viability is inconsistent with a sexual-orientation bias. The
review that marriage’s dynamic decision making and
deliberately incomplete bargaining model is consistent with
the incomplete contract paradigm. Therefore, this strictly
constructionist view of marriage is consistent with the idea of
bestowing marriage rights to same-sex couples, as the
structural arrangement of the institution is robust against
gender or sexual orientation.
As private romantic aspirations culminate into marriage,
individuals bring their intimate desires into public square.
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Entry to this public square must not be limited by sexual
orientation. Same-sex marriage challenges many of society’s
long held beliefs and comes into a collision course with the
majority’s morality. However, even society’s cost of moral
outrage cannot justify keeping same-sex couples outside the
exclusivity of marriage.
Delving into the archives of America’s constitutional
history the frontiers of privacy and the rights to equality are
expanding continuously. Yet, these liberal ideals of the
Constitution are hopelessly ill equipped to recognize
marriage rights for same-sex individuals. Debate rages on
through the court system, through the legislatures, through
the legal scholarship, grappling over what right must
encapsulate same-sex couple’s ability to marry. From a
constitutional perspective, extending marriage rights to samesex individuals may not require creating new rights; rather it
requires fulfilling the promise of recognition to the
unenumerated rights.
The journey from Griswold to Lawrence has been long
and arduous. Lawrence’s promise of equality may not have
been fulfilled, yet each constitutional turning point gets us
closer to developing a full understanding of human existence
and of human personhood.
Implicit in this human
understanding is the recognition of same-sex orientation, not
as a choice, rather as an immutable uniqueness in man’s
evolution. Caught in the web of unattainable love are those
unique immutable individuals amongst us, yearning for
equality and approval. Granting social approval to same-sex
couples will not only require deviation from the path nestled
deeply in American historical traditions, but also rewrite
Shakespeare’s saga of two star-crossed lovers, haunted
forever by their unobtainable, unrecognized love. While the
beloved Juliet could never gain social approval for her love of
Romeo, we could learn from antiquity’s mistakes. Do we
have the courage?

